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expansive reading of Sugarman's language and leaves uncertain exactly
when the Justices will invoke the Sugarman exception and use less de-
manding review. The Foley opinion also leaves unclear which form of
scrutiny-strict, intermediate, or minimal-the Court will apply in any
given case involving the denial of state employment to aliens.
Robert J Holland
Recognition of an Implied Covenant of Habitability in
Residential Leaseholds: Kamarath v. Bennett
C.C. Bennett ordered his tenant, Wilford Kamarath, to vacate his apart-
ment after the apartment building was found to violate the Dallas, Texas
housing codes. The tenant refused, remaining for several months without
paying rent. Kamarath then moved out and sued his former landlord to
recover damages, claiming that the landlord's failure to maintain the
premises in a habitable condition constituted a breach of their lease agree-
ment. The trial court held that Bennett had neither breached the contract
nor violated any duty imposed by law. The court of appeals affirmed,'
reiterating the well-established common law rule that a landlord does not
impliedly warrant that the leased premises are habitable or reasonably
suited for occupancy. The Texas Supreme Court granted a writ of error.
Held, reversed: There is an implied covenant of habitability imposed by
law in residential leases which requires the unit to be suitable for living.
Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978).
I. EVOLUTION OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF HABITABILITY
Traditionally, the doctrine of caveat emptor governed the lessor-lessee
relationship,2 and Texas courts uniformly followed that doctrine.' The
landlord could agree to make needed repairs and maintain the condition
1. Kamarath v. Bennett, 549 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977).
2. See, e.g., Fetters v. City of Des Moines, 260 Iowa 490, 149 N.W.2d 815, 819 (1967)(dictum); Walsh v. Schmidt, 206 Mass. 405, 92 N.E. 496 (1910); Roan v. Bruckner, 180 Neb.
399, 143 N.W.2d 108 (1966); Franklin v. Brown, 118 N.Y. 110, 23 N.E. 126 (1889). See
generally Comment, The Implied Warranty of Habitability in Landlord-Tenant Relationships.
The Necessity of Application in Texas, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 64 (1973). See also Comment,
Implied Warranty of Habitability in Lease of Furnished fremises/or Short Term: Erosion of
Caveat Emptor, 3 U. RICH. L. REV. 322 (1969); Note, Implied Warranty of Habitability in
Housing Leases, 21 DRAKE L. REV. 300 (1972).
3. See Yarbrough v. Booher, 141 Tex. 420, 174 S.W.2d 47 (1943); Morton v. Burton-
Lingo Co., 136 Tex. 263, 150 S.W.2d 239 (1941); Lynch v. Ortlieb, 70 Tex. 727, 8 S.W. 515
(1888); Weinstein v. Harrison, 66 Tex. 546, 1 S.W. 626 (1886); Kallison v. Ellison, 430
S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968, no writ); Goldstein v. Corrigan, 405
S.W.2d 425 (rex. Civ. App.-Waco 1966, no writ).
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of the premises, but the law imposed no such duty upon him.4 The tenant
could not avoid liability for nonpayment of rent if the premises became
uninhabitable;5 only when the landlord procured the lease by fraudulent
or deceitful means could the tenant escape his obligations under the agree-
ment.6 Texas courts, however, did not apply the doctrine in two other
areas of real estate law. First, caveat emptor was not applied to the lease
of a building when construction thereof had not progressed sufficiently for
the tenant to judge its suitability for the intended use.7 Secondly, the
supreme court more recently held that the doctrine was inapplicable to the
sale of new houses by a builder-vendor.8
The common law rule has found little support among those courts that
have recently passed upon the question.9 The Supreme Court of Wiscon-
sin was among the first to revise its stance.' ° In a probing reexamination
of the doctrine of caveat emptor, the court reasoned that the legislature
had made its intention known by passing laws and providing for adminis-
trative rules that set minimum requirements for housing." The court de-
termined that such legislation had rendered the traditional rule obsolete.'
2
Although most courts that have recognized a covenant of habitability to
be implied in leases have followed the Wisconsin court's reasoning,' 3 the
Supreme Court of New Jersey has adopted a different approach. Rather
than holding that the covenant arises from statutes or municipal codes, the
4. See Walling v. Houston & T.C.R.R., 195 S.W. 232 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1915,
writ refd).
5. See Hoover v. Wukasch, 274 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1955, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
6. See Lynch v. Ortlieb, 70 Tex. 727, 8 S.W. 515 (1888).
7. J.D. Young Corp. v. McClintic, 26 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1930), rev'd
on other grounds, 66 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, holding approved) (building
leased after construction had begun but before construction had progressed to the point that
tenant could judge its suitability for the intended use).
8. Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
9. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Jack Spring, Inc.
v. Little, 50 Inl. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304
(1974); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); Kline v.
Burns, I ll N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc.,
459 Pa. 450, 329 A.2d 812 (1974).
Some jurisdictions have also imposed the covenant of habitability by statute. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1941, 1942 (West 1954); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 239, § 8A (Michie/Law.
Co-op Supp. 1978). See generally Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability. An Incipient
Trend in the Law of Landlord-Tenant?, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 123 (1971).
A few jurisdictions still adhere to the common law rule. See, e.g., Knuckles v. Spaugh, 26
N.C. App. 340, 215 S.E.2d 825, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 241, 217 S.E.2d 665 (1975); Sheppard
v. Nienow, 254 S.C. 44, 173 S.E.2d 343 (1970).
10. Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
11. 111 N.W.2d at 412-13.
12. "[T]he legislature has made a policy judgment-that it is socially (and politically)
desirable to impose these duties on a property owner. . . . To follow the old rule of no
implied warranty of habitability in leases would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with current
legislative policy concerning housing standards." Id
13. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Kline v. Bums,
Ill N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
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court held that it arises from the intention of the parties, inferred from the
terms of the lease.' 4 In Marini v. Ireland'5 the court found the requisite
intent in a description of the leased premises as a "4 rooms and bath,
apartment" and a restriction of the tenant's use of the premises to that of a
"dwelling."
The difference in approach can be important in determining whether an
attempted waiver of the covenant is enforceable. In Javins P. First Na-
tional Really Corp. 16 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that the local housing code must be read into housing con-
tracts. The court then stated: "The duties imposed by the Housing Regu-
lations may not be waived or shifted by agreement if the Regulations
specifically place the duty upon the lessor."' 7  A waiver by the parties
would therefore be ineffective.' 8 If, instead, the intent of the parties is the
source of the covenant, a waiver in the lease agreement would indicate that
the parties did not intend to include the covenant in their agreement.' 9 A
growing body of consumer law suggests, however, that such a conclusion
should not be drawn where the waiving party is at a clear disadvantage in
bargaining power.2"
Early suggestions that the implied covenant of habitability is a potential
source of expanded tort liability for landlords2' have not been supported
by the courts. The New Jersey Supreme Court, for example, has refused
to impose strict liability for personal injuries suffered on the leased prem-
ises, adhering instead to traditional negligence requirements.22
II. KAMARATH V. BENNETT
Against this background of changing landlord-tenant law, the Texas
Supreme Court granted a writ of error to examine its longstanding adher-
14. Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130,
265 A.2d 526 (1970); Timber Ridge Town House v. Dietz, 133 N.J. Super. 577, 338 A.2d 21
(Super Ct. Law Div. 1975). The Berzito court held that the housing code was admissible in
determining whether a breach of the implied warranty of habitability had occurred.
15. 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 562, 533-34 (1970).
16. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
17. 428 F.2d at 1081-82.
18. Bui see Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972) (evidence of
waiver was improperly excluded despite earlier reasoning that the covenant arose through
the housing code); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971) (waiver listed as a factor
to be considered in determining whether there had been a breach of the implied covenant).
19. New Jersey courts have consistently considered evidence of waiver of the covenant
in determining the presence of a breach. See, e.g., Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308
A.2d 17 (1973); Timber Ridge Town House v. Dietz, 133 N.J. Super. 577, 338 A.2d 21
(Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975).
20. Cf. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (con-
tract of sale for furniture held unconscionable where buyer had no meaningful choice as to
terms and where terms were so extreme as to appear unconscionable according to mores and
business practices of time and place); Slaughter v. Jefferson Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 361 F.
Supp. 590 (D.D.C. 1973) (cancellation of notes by court upon finding that financing was
extended for unconscionable home improvement contracts).
21. J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 218 (2d ed. 1975).
22. Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973).
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ence to the common law rule.23 In line with the reasoning followed by the
New Hampshire Supreme Court in Kline v. Burns,24 the Texas court ex-
amined at length the context in which the landlord-tenant relationship
originated. 25  The court noted that the leasehold was originally viewed as
an estate in land governed by principles of property law.26 In an agrarian
society possession and the right to quiet enjoyment were central to the les-
sor-lessee relationship.27 Today, however, the apartment dweller is not
interested in procuring an estate in land; he is merely seeking a habitable
place to live. 2' The court recognized that the legislature has responded to
this change by granting home rule cities the authority to enact minimum
housing standards and the power to enforce them.29  The court observed
that in the instant case the landlord admitted that the premises in question
were in violation of such a housing code.3"
In its analysis the court addressed three factors crucial to its decision
that an implied covenant of habitability exists in residential leases: (1) the
legislature's recognition that public welfare may demand that dwellings be
fit for human habitation; (2) the landlord's superior knowledge of the
premises he leases and the likelihood that he would know of housing code
violations and latent defects when a tenant might not; and (3) the land-
lord's continued ownership of the premises after expiration of the lease,
which makes it logical that he bear the cost of repairs necessary to make
the premises habitable.3 For these reasons, the court recognized an im-
plied covenant of habitability in the rental of dwelling units.3 2
23. Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978). No Texas court of civil appeals
had previously questioned adherence to the doctrine of caveat emptor.
24. 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
25. 568 S.W.2d at 659-60.
26. Id at 560.
27. Id.
28. Id
29. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1175, § 35 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
30. 568 S.W.2d at 660.
31. Id
32. Id at 660-61. The supreme court's decision in Kamarath is directed only toward
residential dwelling units. Inasmuch as the implied warranty of habitability is analogous to
the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose in the sale of goods, TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 2.315 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968), a question remains as to how far the
courts will eventually go in replacing older, more rigid property law principles with current
contract doctrines. As mentioned in the text accompanying note 8 supra, the Texas
Supreme Court has for the past decade recognized an implied warranty of fitness for habita-
bility in the sale of new homes. As contracts for the lease and sale of farmlands and busi-
ness properties do not directly affect the public welfare to the extent that contracts on
residential dwellings do, the court will probably draw a distinction. Should the situation
arise, however, where the interest of the general public is threatened by adverse operation of
the doctrine of caveat emptor in these areas, the court may respond in like fashion by recog-
nizing some type of warranty of fitness for the intended use. Such a theory is strengthened
by the legislature's inclusion of land sales and leases, in general, within the protections of the
Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §
17.45 (Vernon Supp. 1978). In concluding that an implied covenant of habitability exists in
the rental of residential units, the court looked to the legislature's action in establishing
authority for creation of minimum housing standards. Legislative concern in these other
areas might be sufficient to convince a court to extend the new rule to the point that all
property must be fit for its intended use.
1040 [Vol. 32
The court clearly indicated that only those defects that "render the
premises unsafe, unsanitary, or otherwise unfit for living therein" will re-
sult in a breach of the implied covenant of habitability.33 The premises
must be fit for living at the inception of the lease and must be maintained
in such a condition.3 4 Furthermore, a tenant may not subject the premises
to harsh and abnormal uses which deteriorate the dwelling and subse-
quently claim that the landlord has breached his legal duty to keep the unit
in suitable living condition.3 In the final analysis, presence of a breach of
the covenant is a question of fact which may only be resolved by weighing
a variety of considerations.36
The court's opinion left unanswered several important questions. No
opinion was expressed as to the proper measure of damages for breach of
the covenant, 37 nor did the court rule upon the applicability of the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA)31 to a breach
33. 568 S.W.2d at 661.
34. Id
35. Id;see J. CRIBBET, supra note 21, at 209-11.
36. 568 S.W.2d at 661. The court listed a number of factors to be considered in decid-
ing whether the covenant has been breached. While the nature of the deficiency, its effect
on the habitability of the structure, the length of time for which the defect has been present,
and the age of the the structure represent physical considerations related to the condition of
the premises, the amount of rent, location of the premises, presence of waiver provisions,
and conduct of the tenant represent factors that should only be relevant when considering
damages and affirmative defenses.
37. Prior to recognition of the implied covenant of habitability, the tenant could not
recover damages, regardless of the condition of the premises. The lessee's only recourse was
to vacate the premises at his peril and hope that the court would regard the poor conditions
of his dwelling as having constructively evicted him. See, e.g., Keating v. Springer, 146 I11.
481, 34 N.E. 805 (1893); Higgins v. Whiting, 102 N.J.L. 279, 131 A. 879 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
With recognition of the covenant, however, most courts have held that the basic contract
remedies are available to the tenant upon the landlord's breach of the implied covenant of
habitability. For example, the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Kline v. Burns, I ll N.H.
87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971), held that the basic contract remedies of damages, reformation, and
recission are available to a tenant following his landlord's breach. The court held that the
tenant's rent liability was limited to the fair rental value of the premises while they were in
an unfit, unsafe, or unsanitary condition. Such a holding was in line with the earlier hold-
ing by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia that the possible
suspension of a tenant's obligation to pay rent was a question properly left to the jury. The
jury could then determine whether all, part, or none of the rent for the period of the breach
was due based on its evaluation of the fair rental value of the premises. Javins v. First Nat'l
Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082-83 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
New Jersey's experience is perhaps the most instructive when considering remedies for
breach of the implied covenant of habitability. In Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d
526 (1970), the New Jersey Supreme Court provided for the self-help remedy of abatement
once proper notice of the needed repairs had been given to the lessor. The tenant was
allowed to make the necessary repairs and deduct their cost from the rent as it became due.
The court, however, did not recognize the availability of damages in Marini. That develop-
ment came two months later in Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268
A.2d 556 (Essex County Ct. 1970). Although the latter case was distinguishable from
Marini in that it concerned a multifamily dwelling and no written lease, the court held the
Marini principles were nonetheless applicable. The lessor argued that under Marini the
tenant's sole option was to make the repairs or move. The court dismissed such a conten-
tion as placing "an emphasis on form, technicality, and fiction." The tenant was then al-
lowed to withhold the difference between the agreed rental and the fair rental value of the
premises in the unrepaired condition, thereby establishing a setoff for damages.
38. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
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of the implied covenant of habitability. Under the DTPA a consumer may
maintain an action if he has been adversely affected by the breach of an
implied warranty. 9 Thus, if breach of the implied covenant of habitabil-
ity is found to be a violation of the DTPA, the lessor might be held liable
for treble the tenant's actual damages plus court costs and reasonable at-
torney's fees."
One writer has suggested that the court implied that landlords might be
able to disclaim the covenant of habitability effectively by use of a
waiver.4" If such a conclusion is proper, the implication was made despite
express recognition by the court that "[i]n the present day housing market,
the landlord is usually in a much better bargaining position than the ten-
ant which could result in the rental of poor housing and violation of public
policies."42 Whether the court will subsequently apply principles of un-
conscionability to negate or limit the use of warranty waivers is an open
question.43 The supreme court recognized a similar problem in Crowell v.
Housing Authority,44 in which it held that an exculpatory clause will be
considered void "where one party is at such disadvantage in bargaining
power that he is practically compelled to submit to the stipulation., 45  Use
of a disclaimer of the implied covenant of habitability as a standard clause
in lease agreements would give the tenant little if any choice.
Even if such a waiver is not void under the traditional contract doctrine
of unconscionability, its inclusion as a standard clause might constitute an
''unconscionable action or course of action" under the statutory definition
in the DTPA 6.4  In fact, a waiver of the covenant might be totally ineffec-
39. Id. § 17.50(a)(2).
40. Such a conclusion would enable aggrieved tenants to gain access more readily to the
courts, thereby discouraging the maintenance of dwelling units in an uninhabitable condi-
tion. In any event, the landlord could avoid treble damages by curing the defect. Id §
17.50A(3).
41. Heath, The Implied Warranty of Habitabdity, PROB. & PROP., Summer 1978, at 9.
Heath also suggests that a waiver of the implied covenant of habitability should comply with
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). On the other hand, he
notes that id § 2.302 provides for the defense of unconscionability.
In fact, the Texas Apartment Association has released a new standardized lease form that
waives the implied covenant of habitability. The Dallas Morning News, Sept. 6, 1978, at
IA, col. 4. The Texas Tenants Rights Association, a coalition of tenants' groups, has an-
nounced its intention to file suit over the new lease form. Id
42. 568 S.W.2d at 660.
43. See notes 16-20 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the manner in
which other jurisdictions have dealt with waivers.
44. 495 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. 1973) (Exculpatory clause read as follows: "IN]or shall the
Landlord nor any of its representatives or employees be liable for any damage to person or
property of the Tenant, his family, or his visitors, which might result from the condition of
these or other premises of the Landlord, from theft or from any cause whatsoever." The
clause was declared void insofar as it affected the Authority's liability for medical expenses
incurred and pain and suffering of tenant who was alleged to have died of carbon monoxide
poisoning from a defective gas heater.)
45. Id at 889.
46. The statutory definition of an unconscionable action or course of action is:
[Ain act or practice which, to a person's detriment: (A) takes advantage of the
lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity of a person to a grossly
unfair degree; or (B) results in a gross disparity between the value received
and consideration paid, in a transaction involving transfer of consideration.
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